amir sulaiman: the meccan openings

Amir Sulaiman's latest album, The Meccan Openings, is available for FREE download here. (And if you don't like downloading, most if not all of the songs are available on YouTube in some form). I haven't finished listening yet but so far the first couple of tracks have really drawn me in. I'm really curious to get a better sense of where Amir Sulaiman is at spiritually.

My lyricism is an exercise in exorcism.
But the exoteric call it eso-terrorism.
I learned jihad from Rumi.
The Sunni call me Shia.
The Shia call me Sufi.

the ghadir declaration

I haven't written a "Su-shi" (Sunni - Shia) post in a very long time so I'm going to share a link to an interesting free book I found online: The Ghadir Declaration by Dr. Tahir-ul-Qadri. The author is a Sunni scholar who brings together different versions of the famous hadith where Muhammad (saaws) says: "One who has me as his master has ‘Alī as his master."

The author frames such hadith by talking about two parallel concepts of leadership, a public political leadership, first held by Abu Bakr as-Saiddiq (ra), and a hidden spiritual leadership, first held by Imam Ali. Dr. Tahir-ul-Qadri goes on to explain:

The manifest caliphate is the political office of the religion of Islam.
The hidden caliphate is exclusively a spiritual office.

The manifest caliphate is an elective and consultative issue.
The hidden caliphate is an inherent and selective act.

The manifest caliph is elected by the people.
The hidden caliph is elected by God.

The manifest caliph is elected.
The hidden caliph is selected.

This is the reason that the first caliph Abū Bakr as-Siddīq (RA) was elected on the basis of ‘Umar Fārūq’s proposal and the support of the majority of public opinion. But the election of the first Imām of spiritual sovereignty — ‘Alī al-Murtadā (AS) — required neither anybody’s proposal nor support.

Caliphate was a democratic act, therefore, the Prophet (SAW) did not declare it. Spiritual leadership was an act of designation; therefore, the Prophet (SAW) declared it in the valley of Ghadīr Khum.

The Prophet (SAW) left the election of the caliph to the will of the people, but himself announced his spiritual heir with the divine consent.

Caliphate is established for improving the administration of the earth.
Spiritual leadership is established to beautify it with the heavenly charm and grace.

Caliphate makes men just.
Spiritual leadership makes them perfect.

Caliphate is confined to the floor.
Spiritual leadership extends to the Throne.

Caliphate is ineffective without crowning.
Spiritual leadership is effective even without crowning.

This is probably the reason that caliphate is entrusted to the Ummah, and
Spiritual leadership is entrusted to the progeny.

“Thus we can deny neither the khilāfah (caliphate; political leadership) nor the wilāyah (spiritual leadership). The direct caliphate of Abū Bakr as-Siddīq (RA) was established with the consensus of the people and is categorically proved by the evidence of history. The direct spiritual leadership of ‘Alī al-Murtadā (AS) was announced by the Prophet (SAW) himself and is categorically proved by the evidence of unbroken chain of traditions. The proof of the caliphate is the consensus of the Companions (RA), the proof of spiritual sovereignty (wilāyah) is the declaration of the Prophet (SAW). One who denies the caliphate in fact denies history and consensus, and one who denies the spiritual leadership (wilāyah) denies the Prophet’s declaration. Therefore, both the caliphate and the spiritual leadership are inescapable realities. What is urgently needed is a clear understanding of the reality of the two institutions in order to present them to the people as unity, and not as division.”

It should be understood that just as the manifest caliphate started with the early caliphs and its blessings percolated down to the righteous and just rulers, similarly the hidden caliphate started with ‘Alī al-Murtadā (AS) and its blessings gradually trickled to the members of the Prophet’s family and the saints of the Ummah. By means of the declaration — مَنْ كُنْتُ مَولاهُ فَعَلِيٌّ مَولاهُ (one who has me as his master has ‘Alī as his master) — and — عليّ وليكم من بعدي (‘Alī is your spiritual leader after me) — the Prophet (SAW) pronounced ‘Alī (AS) as the opener of the spiritual kingdom.

For a while I've known that the Zaydis existed (a group of Shias who leaned towards accepting the status of Abu Bakr) but this is the first time I've heard/read from a Sunni scholar who seems to lean so hard towards Shiism.

see also: "i'm sushi"

ya husayn (no, not about obama)

Especially after the last post, I feel like asking the following question: Over at the Ihsan group blog, the latest entry is titled Ya Husayn Ya Husayn and features a video of Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan performing a piece about Hussein at Karbala. So my question is whether it is possible for a Sunni to embrace the lyrics of that piece or do they go outside the parameters of what is permissible for a member of Ahl al-Sunnah wal Jamaat?

"i'm sushi"

Since I am actually on the Su-Shi (Sunni-Shia) blogring but it's been over a year since I have made any sushi-related posts, the following seems overdue.

In the article Sunni & Shia: I’m “Sushi”, Dr. Hesham A. Hassaballa gives a description of the "su-shi" position, at least as it relates to himself:

In fact, there was no such thing as “Shia” or “Sunni” throughout the period of the four Caliphs. The first time the term “Shia,” was even used was during the civil war between Ali (r) and Mu’awiyah (r). Those who supported the claim of Ali (r) to the Caliphate were termed Shiat Ali, or the “Party of Ali.” Yet, it was not a “sect,” as we understand it today. In fact, it took decades, if not centuries, for the “doctrines” (for lack of a better term) of Shi’ism and Sunnism to fully develop.

Nevertheless, at its essence, the difference between Sunni and Shi’i is jurisprudential: Sunnis believe that political (and by extension religious) leadership can reside with anyone in the larger community, as long as the community accepts said person’s qualifications. For Shi’is, however, political (and religious) leadership must be within the House of the Prophet (pbuh). Another important distinction between Sunnis and Shi’is is the issue of the probity, or upright character, of all of the Companions. It is a fundamental part of Sunni doctrine, whereas some Shi’is do not necessarily ascribe to this. That is it.

Now, over time, these two “philosophical” differences developed into distinct schools of thought, especially with respect to matters of Islamic law. But, again, that took centuries to develop. Furthermore, many people associate with Shi’is an intense love for the House of the Prophet (pbuh). Yet, is this not an essential aspect of Sunni belief as well? Could one be Muslim and not love the family of the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh)? Both Imam Malik (r) and Imam Abu Hanifah (r), two stalwarts of the Sunni community, were ardent supporters of the House of the Prophet (pbuh). In fact, they could be called “Political Shi’is” because of this support.

[...]

Now, technically, I am a Sunni, of Maliki/Hanafi (or “Malifi") leanings. But, I have a deep and profound love of the House of the Prophet (pbuh). Even though I will not be pounding my chest on Ashura, like many Shi’is do, the murder of Imam Hussein was extremely painful for me. He is my Imam, too. All of the Imams of the House of the Prophet (pbuh), in fact, are my Imams. So, I am proud to call myself a “Sushi,” as well. And I don’t even like fish.

Grenada's past:
egypt and the shias

islam and the passion (for social justice)

On YouTube I found an excerpt from a Coversation between Cornel West and Toni Morrisson which touched on the political implications of Mel Gibson's Passion (among other things). I was also able to find a fuller transcript of the conversation from The Nation's website under the title Blues, Love and Politics. The aspect which I found most intriguing is the distinction West makes between being a "Prophetic Christian" and a "Constantinian Christian" and it made me wonder about whether a similar distinction could be applied to Islam.

MORRISON: [reading] "I am curious about the language of religion, which has become more pronounced in this Administration. Can you comment on the manipulation of religious belief and language for violent ends?"

WEST: That's one of the most dangerous features of our moment, there's no doubt about that. We live in a society in which 96 percent of our fellow citizens believe in God, and 72 percent believe Jesus Christ is the Son of God, 71 percent believe that the Book of Revelation has an empirically verifiable potential and 71 percent believe in angels. I don't put that down, I'm a Christian myself, but I'm a different kind of Christian than a lot of these Christians.

[...]

WEST: [...] the other side of this thing is that here we are, living in the biggest empire since the Roman Empire. Now the underside of the Roman Empire is the cross; that's why political prisoners were put to death, those who had the courage to act against the powers that be. We're the legatees of Constantinian Christianity, after Christianity was incorporated into the Roman Empire and was the official religion of the Roman Empire, which went on persecuting Jews and others.

Now, you see, I'm a prophetic Christian, I'm not a Constantinian Christian. That's very important. Because I want to raise the question, well, if you're going to talk about Jesus, did you really talk about the empire that put him to death and what the connection is between that empire and the empire that we're a part of now, and what Jesus demands of us in this empire given what he was willing to sacrifice in his own imperial moment? And I say now, Gibson, what have you got to say? But, he says, no, I'm going to give you sadomasochistic voyeurism.

So does this distinction play itself out in Islam? If so, how are the lines drawn?

Some might be tempted to say that the so-called Progressive Muslims are perhaps the analogue of West's "Prophetic Christian" but ironically, a number of those who use this label (like Irshad Manji for instance) are only liberal when it comes to religious issues but are neocons in terms of their politics. And conversely, in the egalitarian face of islamic orthodoxy we have already seen some indication of how orthodox Islam is actually rather progressive, at least in terms of the economic aspects of social justice.

Some might be tempted to say that Sunni Islam is the "Imperial" Islam while Shiism is more the Islam of the persecuted powerless minority. But that would be a little bit too simple.

For example, for a while now I've been meaning to elaborate on the fact that each of the four great imams who established the foundations for orthodox Sunni law had spent some time in prison or otherwise punished by for principled disobedience to the state of their day.

And conversely, within Shiism, Ali Shariati makes the distinction between Red Shi'ism (the religion of martyrdom) vs. Black Shi'ism (the religion of mourning) each with their own attitudes towards monarchy and clerical power. Some Shias focus on Imam Hussein's noble sacrifices in the interests of justice while others, in a Gibson-esque way, choose to emphasize the blood and gore.

I feel like something more detailed should be said, but I think I'll just end up repeating a point I already tried to make clear in ideology and temperament; namely that if some Muslims have a greater concern for social justice than others, they will not be identified merely by ideological labels ("progresive" , "orthodox", "shia" etc.) but on the existential decisions individuals make in their everyday lives.

Other Grenada:
islam needs radicals
sushi revisited: part one
ali shariati